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Termination Of Parental Rights On The
Basis Of Mental Disability: A Problem
In Policy And Interpretation
Paul Bernstein*
Recent court interpretation of an apparently technical
amendment to California Civil Code section 232 has brought about
a disturbing change in the state's power to take children away from
parents who have been identified as mentally ill.1 Although
California law allows the state to deprive parents permanently of
the custody of their children if the fitness of parents has been
judged to fall short of the "minimal level demanded by society"
2
the law has traditionally judged parental unfitness by tangible
evidence of abandonment, neglect, and cruelty. 3  As some courts
now read the amended version of section 232, any parent who has
* .D. University of California, Los Angeles, 1985, B.A. Yale University 1973.
1. California Civil Code section 232(a)(6) previously read:
An action may be brought for the purpose of having any person under the age
of 18 years declared free from the custody and control of either or both of his
parents when such person comes within any of the following descriptions..
. (6) [Person] [w]hose ... parents are, and will remain incapable of supporting
or controlling the child ... because of mental deficiency or ... illness.
1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 978, sec. 1, at 3524 (amending CAL. Crv. CODE § 232(a)(6)) (amended by 1983
Cal. Stat. ch. 309, sec. 2, at 903). This section now reads:
An action may be brought for the purpose of having any child under the age
of 18 years declared free from the custody and control of either or both of his
parents when such person comes within any of the following descriptions..
. (6) [Person] [w]hose parents are mentally disabled and are likely to remain
so in the foreseeable future. As used in this subdivision, "mentally disabled"
means that a parent or parents suffer any mental incapacity or disorder which
renders the parent or parents unable to adequately care for and control the
child.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(6) (West 1990).
2. Guardianship of Baby Boy M., 66 Cal. App. 3d 254, 265, 135 Cal. Rptr. 866, 872 (1977)
(citation omitted).
3. CAL Civ. CODE § 232(a)(l)-(2) (West Supp. 1990).
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ever received any mental health diagnosis may run the risk of
losing custody of his or her children, possibly with no additional
showing required.
This Article discusses the legislative amendment to section 232
and judicial interpretation of the amendment. The Article suggests
that the legislature did not intend to sweep with as broad a brush
as the courts have applied and that a broad interpretation clashes
with the general policies underlying the statutory scheme. The
mental health provision of section 232, as the courts have read it,
gives the state much more power than do the other provisions of
section 232 to intrude upon the constitutionally recognized right to
parent. Any state interest that might justify this intrusion upon a
constitutional right derives from the proposition that the mental
health profession can accurately diagnose and predict dangerous
behavior and, to a lesser extent, from a mistaken but widespread
notion that all persons identified as mentally ill are violent.4 As
this Article discusses later, the accuracy of psychiatric diagnoses
and predictions of dangerous behavior has been often questioned,
by courts as well as mental health professionals.
4. "In the great majority of the cases, the image of the former mental patient as a homicidal
maniac in need of restraint is far from the truth." National Institute of Mental Health, THE 14 WORST
MYTHS ABOUT RECOVER MENTAL PATIENTS (1985) 11. Note that an individual need not be a
mental patient at present to fall under the provisions of section 232(a)(6) but merely have a "mental
disability," a term not specifically defined in law or the mental health profession. See supra note 1.
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The conferring of power by the state on the mental health
profession has been criticized or limited in other contexts, such as
involuntary commitment,5  the right to refuse medication,6
electroshock,7 and psychosurgery, and the extent to which
psychiatrists should be involved in criminal trials and sentencing.9
The termination of parental rights because of an existing mental
health diagnosis, with no showing of neglect, cruelty, abandonment,
or other traditional measures of unfitness to parent, confers yet
another power on the mental health profession. This new power has
not been questioned to the extent that it should be, in light of the
criticisms of and limitations on analogous uses of the mental health
profession's power.
5. See, e.g. T. Szasz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL I.LNEss (1961) (psychiatrist's criticism of
psychiatry and commitment laws); A. Brandt, RE'rxrY POUCE (1976) (psychiatry and involuntary
commitment as means of enforcing social mores); B. Ennis, PRISONERS OF PsYCHIATRY (1972) (legal
criticism of psychiatry and commitment laws); Hardisty, Mental Illness: A Legal Fiction, 48 WASH.
L. REv. 735 (1973); Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 Science 250 (January 1973)
(graduate students in experiment told to report to mental hospital and say only that they were hearing
voices; all admitted with psychiatric diagnosis and held for as long as 52 days); CALIFORNIA
LEGISLATURE ASSEMBLY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MENTAL HEALTH SERvICES, THE DILEMMA OF
MENTAL CoMMrrmENTs iN CALIFORNIA (1967) (legislative study leading to the enactment of
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, California's involuntary commitment statute); O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563,584 (1975) (Burger, CJ., concurring) (quoting Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S.
366, 375 (1956))(confnement without treatment in mental hospital unconstitutional).
6. See, e.g., Riese v. St. Mary's Hospital and Medical Center, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 1320,
271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 210-11 (1987) (upholding right of involuntary mental patients to refuse
antipsychotic medication absent judicial finding of incompetence).
7. See, e.g., CAL WELT. & INST. CODE § 5326.7 (West 1984) (providing detailed informed
consent requirements for administration of electroconvulsive therapy).
8. See, e.g. id., § 5326.6 (providing similar restrictions on psychosurgery).
9. Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 455-56 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (improper for
psychiatrist to give opinion as to outcome of case); Report of the Task Force on the Role of
Psychology in the Criminal Justice System, 33 AmERicAN PSYCHOLOGIST 1099-1113 (Dec. 1978)
(criticizing mental health professionals in the courtroom for offering conclusions more properly the
province of judge or jury); S. Pollack, Psychiatric Consultation For the Court, in MENDEL &
SOLOMON, THE PSYCHIATIC CONSULTATION (1968), reprinted in PRACTICING LAW INSTrruE,
EFFECTIVE UTIIZATION OF PsYcHiTAiC EVIDENCE (1970) (stating view that most mental health
professionals believe opinions relating their findings to legal issues are beyond their expertise); M.
BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAW 359 (2d ed. 1982) (courts should move
towards prohibiting psychiatric experts from testifying as to the ultimate question of criminal
responsibility); C. Smith, PSYCHIATRIC APPROACHES TO THE MENTALLY ILL FEDERAL OFFENDER,
39 F.R.D. 523, 560 (1965) (medical director of the Bureau of Prisons advises Ninth Circuit
Sentencing Institute that psychiatrists should "'avoid gratuitous statements reflecting their views of
what the outcome of the case should be").
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I. LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT AND JuDIcIAL
INTERPRETATION
Until 1983, California Civil Code section 232(a)(6) allowed
termination of parental rights to custody of their child for parents
"incapable of supporting or controlling the child... because of
mental deficiency or... [mental] illness." 10 The present version
substitutes "mental disability" for the terms "mental deficiency"'
or "mental illness" and allows termination of rights of parents
who are "mentally disabled and are likely to remain so in the
foreseeable future."" The statute defines "mentally disabled"
to mean "that a parent or parents suffer any mental incapacity or
disorder which renders the parent unable to adequately care for and
control the child."
12
As will be discussed later in more detail, the change in wording
was ifot a central part of the bill that amended section 232."3 The
legislative history of the 1983 amendment does not indicate the
intent behind the new wording and reflects no debate over the
change. 4 No basis exists for concluding that the change is
anything but a technical adjustment. Two appellate courts found the
change highly significant, however, and used it as a basis for
limiting parental rights. 5
The original legislative intent of section 232(a)(6) was "to
cover a situation where the parent is not committed to a state
hospital, but is hospitalized under a Short-Doyle program 6 or
similar operation. This would provide local machinery that
presently exists for the state hospital situation.', 17 Prior to the
10. 1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 978, sec. 1, at 3524 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(6) (amended
by 1983 CaL Stat. ch. 309, sec. 2, at 903).
11. CAL. -iv. CODE § 232(a)(6) (West Supp. 1990).
12. Id.
13. See 1983 Cal. Stat. ch. 309.
14. See infra notes 43-53 & accompanying text (discussing legislative history of amendment).
15. See infra notes 24-42 & accompanying text (discussing In re Amie M. and In re Christina
A).
16. The Short-Doyle Act governs funding and organization of California's mental health
system. See CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE § 5600 et seq. (1990).
17. In re R.S., 167 Cal.App.3d 946, 956, 213 Cal. Rptr. 690, 695 (1985).
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1983 amendment, the courts had interpreted the term "mentally ill
persons" pursuant to this legislative intent to mean those persons
"[w]ho are of such mental condition that they are in need of
supervision, treatment, care or restraint" or "[w]ho are of such
mental condition that they are dangerous to themselves or to the
person or property of others." 8 This interpretation was consistent
with other California statutes defining mental illness as a legal term
of art and requiring, for example, a showing of dangerousness in
addition to a mental health diagnosis before imposing involuntary
detention in a mental hospital.19
Interpreting former section 232(a)(6) in In re Carmaleta B.,20
the California Supreme Court stressed "the proposition that family
rights, both the parent's and the child's rights, should not be
vulnerable to a too easy finding of mental illness. Indeed, the
strictness of this definition of mental illness has acted as a
safeguard to protect the primacy of the family." 21 The provision
appeared to function as a shortcut for proving neglect or
abandonment, similar to the provision that an imprisoned parent
may be deemed automatically unable to care for the child without
any additional showing beyond the fact of incarceration.22
Similarly, a parent committed to a mental hospital for a significant
stay has been deemed constructively to have abandoned the
child.23
In 1986, California's Fifth District Court of Appeal gave the
new section 232 its first judicial reading and drastically changed
the scope of its coverage. In In re Amie M.,24 the Fifth District
interpreted the change in statutory language, which eliminated the
terms "mental deficiency" and "mental illness" and replaced
18. In re Carmaleta B., 21 Cal. 3d 482, 490, 579 P.2d 514, 519, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623, 628
(1978), quoting In re Baby Boy T., 9 Cal. App. 3d 815, 820, 88 Cal. Rptr. 418, 421 (1970).
19. Carmaleta,21 Cal. 3d at490 n.7.,579 P.2d at519 n.7,146 Cal. Rptr. at 628 n.7. See also
Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding unconstitutional a statutory scheme that
allowed involuntary detention for psychiatric treatment without a showing of dangerousness).
20. 21 Cal. 3d 482, 579 P.2d 514, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978).
21. Id. at 491, 579 P.2d at 519, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
22. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(4) (West Supp. 1990) (conviction of a felony).
23. Id. § 232(a)(5).
24. In re Arnie M., 180 Cal. App. 3d 668, 225 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1986).
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them with the term "mentally disabled," as a repudiation of the
Carmaleta case.' The Fifth District focused on "the rule that an
amendment materially changing a statute following a court decision
interpreting the statute in its original form is to be regarded as an
indication of legislative intent to change the meaning of the
law."26 Although the Carmaleta case had been decided in 1978,
relying on In re Baby Boy T,27 which had been decided in 1970,
debate on the 1983 amendment never mentioned either case.
Nevertheless, the Arnie court held that the legislature had intended
by its changing of two key words to repudiate the Carmaleta
decision.
The reasoning of the Fifth District has since been followed by
the Sixth District.28 The Sixth District, in In re Christina A., also
cited "the amendment and the obvious intent it embodies" in
rejecting a claim that Carmaleta governed.29
The Fifth District in Arnie found the change in wording
significant enough to overcome the Carmaleta court's expressed
reluctance to interpret a statute in the absence of a clearly
expressed legislative standard.3" The Arnie court determined that
by removing the term "mental illness" from the earlier version of
section 232, the legislature had clearly expressed a new
standard.3' As this Article discusses later, this legislative intent is
by no means clear.32
Rn addition, the Arnie court found the change in wording
significant because the old wording used terms defined elsewhere
in the California Code, at former sections 5550 and 5590 of the
25. Id. at 673, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 648.
26. Id., quoting Verreos v. City and County of San Francisco, 63 Cal. App. 3d 86, 99, 133
Cal. Rptr. 649, 657 (1976).
27. 9 Cal. App. 3d 815, 88 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1970).
28. See In re Christina A., 213 Cal. App. 3d 1073, 261 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1989).
29. Id& at 1078, 261 Cal. Rplr. at 906.
30. In re Amie M., 180 Cal. App. 3d at 673,225 Cal. Rptr. at 648 (quoting In re Carmaleta
B., 21 Cal. 3d 482, 492, 579 P.2d 514, 520, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623, 629).
31. Id.
32. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
1160
1991 / Termination Of Parental Rights
Welfare and Institutions Code which governed civil
commitment.33 The Carmaleta court had interpreted section 232
by referring to the definition of the term "mentally ill persons"
contained in Welfare and Institutions Code section 5550 and the
term "mentally deficient persons" contained in section 5590.'
The Amie court reasoned that by removing those terms from
section 232, the legislature meant to indicate that the new terms
were not to be interpreted by reference to sections 5550 and
5590."3
It should be noted, however, that sections 5550 and 5590 had
been repealed long before Carmaleta was decided. They were
repealed by the enactment of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act in
1967.36 The Carmaleta case was decided in 1978. Thus, the
Carmaleta court was aware that the then-current version of section
232 relied on language no longer in the law; nevertheless, the court
used the repealed language in order to interpret section 232. The
court stated that it would look to other statutory definitions of the
same terms, even though abandoned, because of the need to
interpret an ambiguous statute.37
One court of appeal saved the earlier section 232 from being
found void for vagueness only by resorting to the other statutes to
give it meaning, stating, "[W]hen a statute is ambiguous, if indeed
33. Arnie, 180 Cal. App. 3d at 672, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 647. Sections 5550 and 5590 were
repealed in 1967 and replaced with the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, CALt.oRNIA WELFARE AND
INsnTTUIONS CODE Sections 5000 et seq., in 1967. 1967 Cal. Stat. ch. 1667, sec. 36.5, at 4107. See
also CAL. WEmF. & INsT. CODE § 5550 (West 1984), Historical Note.
34. Carmaleta, 21 Cal. 3d at 490 n.7, 579 P.2d at 519 n.7, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 628 n.7, (citing
In re Baby Boy T, 9 Cal. App. 3d 815,820,88 Cal. Rptr. 418,421 (1970). In re Eugene W., 29 Cal.
App. 3d 623, 628 n.2, 105 Cal. Rptr. 736, 739, n.2. Section 5590 defined 'mentally deficient
persons" as "those who are incapable of managing themselves or their affairs independently, with
ordinary prudence, and who require supervision, control and care for their own welfare, or for the
welfare of others or for the welfare of the community." 1965 Cal. Stat. ch. 391, Sec. 5, at 1668
(enacting CA. WEmF. & INST. § 5590). Section 5550 defined "mentally ill persons" as "'those who
come within either or both of the following descriptions: (a) who are of such mental condition that
they are in need of supervision, treatment, care or restraint; (b) who are of such mental condition that
they are dangerous to themselves or to the person or property of others, and are in need of
supervision, treatment, care or restraint." Id sec. 1, at 1654 (enacting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
5550).
35. Amie, 180 Cal. App. 3d at 672-73, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 648.
36. See 1967 Cal. Stat. ch. 1667, sec. 36.5, at 4107 (Lanterman-Petris-Short Act).
37. Carmaleta, 21 Cal. 3d 482, 490-91,579 P.2d 514, 519, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623, 628 (1978).
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this one is, its intent may be gathered from other statutes dealing
with the same subject matter." 3 By relying on sections 5550 and
5590, the court in In re Mark K. was able to find then section 232
constitutionally adequate. If those statutes now do not apply, the
vagueness problem must be addressed anew. The Carmaleta court's
approach may still represent the only way to save section 232.2,
It should be noted that the term "mentally disabled" is not used
elsewhere in California statute and is not a legal or psychological
term of art; no indication exists that it means anything different
from "mental deficiency" or "mental illness" or that it cannot be
interpreted by reference to sections 5550 and 5590.
Having abandoned the earlier restrictions placed by Carmaleta
on terminating the parental rights of parents identified as mentally
ill, the Amie court then proceeded to write broadly: "Under the
new statute, all that is required is that the state prove that the
minor's parent is mentally disabled, i.e., suffers a mental incapacity
or disorder which renders the parents unable to adequately care for
and control the child and which is likely to continue in the
foreseeable future."40 The court added,
No longer is it necessary to demonstrate the need of
supervision, treatment, care or restraint, or to show that the
parent is dangerous to himself or to others; the statute now
expressly includes "any mental incapacity or disorder which
renders the parent or parents unable to adequately care for and
control the child.",
41
38. In re Mark K., 159 Cal. App. 3d 94, 106, 205 Cal. Rptr. 393, 400 (1984) (citing Estate
of McDill, 14 Cal. 3d 831, 837, 537 P.2d 874, 877, 122 Cal. Rptr. 754, 757 (1975)).
39. Another California Court of Appeals raised the vagueness issue but disposed of it on
procedural grounds. See In re Christina A., 213 Cal. App. 3d 1073, 1078, 261 Cal. Rptr. 903, 906
(1989). The parent in that case had not yet reached the permanent termination of rights stage
governed by section 232. Id. The court found that the preliminary dependency findings did not
involve a constitutionally protected interest and, for that reason, did not allow the parent to assert the
vagueness claim. Id. at 1079,261 Cal. Rptr. at 907. It then proceeded to treat the vagueness argument
as a procedural due process claim, which it deemed satisfied by the provision of notice pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5. Id.-It did not reach the question of whether section 232
is unconstitutionally vague. Id.
40. Arnie, 180 Cal. App. 3d at 673, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 648 (emphasis added).
41. Id. (quoting CAL. Civ. CODE § 232(a)(6)).
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As the Article discusses later, the Fifth and Sixth District Courts of
Appeal have focused erroneously on the language "all that is
required" and "any mental incapacity or disorder," ignoring the
still-present requirement of a causal connection between the mental
disability and inability to care for and control the child--the basic
notion justifying termination of rights and a notion that does,
contrary to the Amie court's assertion, imply dangerousness.42
The 1983 amendment was the work of state Senator Robert
Presley.43 According to one legislative summary, the bill
addressed a number of subjects related to freedom from parental
custody and control.44 That summary states with regard to the
mental health provisions:
Prior to enactment of Chapter 309, an action to free a child
from parental custody could be brought if a parent was, and
would remain, incapable of supporting or controlling the child
in a proper manner because of mental deficiency or illness.
Chapter 309 modifies this provision by requiring the child's
parent or parents to be mentally disabled and likely to remain
mentally disabled in the foreseeable future.45
In a footnote, the summary repeats the statutory definition given
the term "mentally disabled."
This author requested from Senator Presley's office all
materials relating to the legislative history of the bill and received
one document, entitled "Assembly Committee on Judiciary SB
304." The document consists of a summary by "Consultant L.
Young" of the bill "as amended 5/19/83." 47 The document
describes its subject as follows: "This bill would make various
changes related to actions that may be brought for the purpose of
42. See infra notes 56-75 and accompanying text.
43. See 1983 Cal. Stat. ch. 309.
44. Note, Selected 1983 California Legislation, 15 PAC. U. 411, 610 (1983).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 610 n.7.
47. Correspondence with Senate Select Committee on Children and Youth, Senator Robert
Presley, Chair, (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal).
1163
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 22
having a minor (1) declared free from parental custody and control
or (2) adjudged a dependent child of the court."48 The bill, as
summarized by consultant Young, addressed the following topics:
parents who are convicted felons, parents "who are [morally]
depraved or suffer an alcohol or drug disability", denial of release
to minors who indicate an unwillingness to return home or who
have been sexually abused, the report of the probation officer,
interview of parties in adoption and "clarifying changes.",
49
It is only under the last topic, "clarifying changes," that the
document discusses mental disability, stating in all pertinent part:
Under existing law, a "232" action may be brought if a
parent is and will remain incapable of supporting or controlling
the child in a proper manner because of "mental deficiency or
mental illness."
This bill would replace those terms with the term
"mentally disabled." "Mentally disabled" would mean that
a parent suffers any mental incapacity or disorder which
renders the parent unable to adequately care for and control
the child.
This bill would also clarify provisions related to experts
who provide evidence on the issue of the parent's mental
incapacity or disorder."
The document goes on to state that "SB 304 has been
introduced as a clean-up bill. It would make numerous substantive
and technical changes in order to rectify oversights and drafting
errors in SB 14 [Chapter 978, Statutes of 1982, the previous
legislative amendment of section 232]. ' ' "1 The document then
discusses the substantive changes, but does not treat the substitution
of the term "mental disability" as substantive. 2
48. L. Young, Assembly Committee on Judiciary SB 304, at I author's files.
49. Id. at 1-4.
50. Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). The document is seven pages in all.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 5-7.
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It is thus evident that the bill was not intended to address the
Carmaleta case, and that the change in wording was a technical,
clean-up amendment not designed to bring about the wholesale
reversal engineered by the Amie court. The amendment did not
represent "language clearly express[ing] such a [different]
standard" that the Carmaleta court had previously found
lacking.53 The Amie court's conclusions as to legislative intent do
not reflect the existing legislative history.
No reason exists to assume that the legislature intended this
technical amendment to make it easier for the state to take away a
person's child than it would be to place that person in a mental
hospital or require out-patient treatment under a Lanterman-Petris-
Short (LPS) conservatorship. 54  Under the Amie court's
interpretation of the statute, every parent who passes through court
for a mental health conservatorship or short-term certification
proceeding should also stop in next door for termination of parental
rights.55 Possibly every parent who stops in at a community
mental health center for counseling could also be referred to Child
Protective Services. Parents considering counselling for loss of a
job or loved one must now consider whether acquiring a
psychiatric diagnosis which an insurance company may require
before agreeing to pay for the counselling might at some point
expose them to possible loss of custody of their children should
they come to the attention of Child Protective Services. Surely such
a serious change in the law would require more direct evidence of
53. In re Arnie M, 180 Cal. App. 3d 668, 673, 225 Cal. Rptr. 645, 648 (quoting Carmalera
21 Cal. 3d 482, 492, 579 P.2d 514, 520, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623, 629).
54. An initial 72-hour detention for psychiatric evaluation requires that the subject, by reason
of mental disorder, be a danger to self or others, or be unable to provide for the basic necessities of
life. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West Supp. 1990) (the Lanterman-Petris-Short or LPS Act).
To place a person on a conservatorship requires proof that the person is gravely disabled by reason
of a mental disorder and has been offered and refused voluntary treatment. CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §§ 5350-5605 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990).
55. Amie M.'s mother was a more serious case: She had an extensive history of mental illness
diagnosis, had been on a conservatorship periodically for several years, believed during Arie's
pregnancy that she was carrying a dog or a cat, accused relatives of being ghosts, believed she had
set fire to the world with a cigarette, and thought sewer lines were connected to a kitchen sink. Arie,
180 Cal. App. 3d at 670-71, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 646. But that is not the point. The rule that emerged
from the case could be applied to much less serious cases.
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legislative intent than an unexplained change in terminology from
"mental deficiency" or "mental illness" to "mental disability."
II. JuDIcIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS ON
TERMINATION OF CUSTODY: CAUSATION, FIESS TO
PARENT, INTRUSION ON THE RIGHT TO PARENT
Even under the present wording of section 232, the mere
existence of a mental disability should not provide sufficient basis
on which to deprive a parent of custody of his or her children.
Rather, the mental disability must be causally connected to an
inability to "adequately care for and control the child." 56
Nevertheless, courts following the Amie case have tended to focus
on the "any mental incapacity or disorder" language, glossing over
the language that follows: "which renders the parent or parents
unable to adequately care for and control the child.", 57 The Sixth
District's approach in In re Christina A. provides some illustration.
In a proceeding to dispense with family reunification services
pursuant to section 361.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code,
after making the children temporary dependents of the court
pursuant to section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the
psychiatric expert testified that the mother "suffered from episodic
alcoholism and had a borderline personality disorder."58 The court
stated:
He opined that appellant was in an early stage of denial as
-to her alcoholism and there was a "great possibility"
appellant would have drinldng episodes again, with their
attendant potential for violence and for trauma to the
children. He testified that appellant was incapable of
56. CAL. CIv. CODE § 232(a)(6) (West Supp. 1990).
57. In re Amnie M., 180 Cal. App. 3d at 673,225 Cal. Rptr. at 648 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 232(a)(6)) (emphasis added).
58. In re Christina A, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1073, 1080, 261 Cal. Rptr. 903, 908 (1989).
California Welfare and Institutions Code Section 361.5(b) permits the court to dispense with family
reunification services if "the parent is suffering from a mental disability ... that renders him or her
incapable of utilizing those services." Section 300 et seq. governs dependency proceedings.
1166
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empathizing with others and that her relationships with her
children were characterized by instability and
inconsistency.59
The expert concluded that the mother "was not capable of
parenting her children."' A second expert diagnosed the mother
"as suffering from episodic alcohol dependence and a mixed
personality disorder with histrionic, narcissistic and borderline
features."61
In his opinion, appellant was unable to parent her children
and would continue to be unable to do so "for the next one
to three years." In the meantime, appellant represented a
"significant danger to their physical and emotional well
being."
62
Although the mother had been arrested on an unspecified charge
and there was evidence of sexual molestation of Christina (the
opinion does not state by whom), the opinion focused solely on the
diagnosis and made no causal connection to any other statutory
criteria for termination of rights, such as abuse or neglect. The
existence of a diagnosis alone was sufficient.
Notice that the court's judgment as to the effect of mental
illness on parenting rests solely on the conclusions of the
experts.63 The experts did not support their conclusions with facts
or offer any causal connection between the diagnosis and the
inability to parent." Judging from the court of appeal's statement
59. Id. at 1080-81, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
60. Id. at 1081, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. The court considered other evidence such as the occurrence of sexual molestation which
may provide other reasons for terminating parental rights under other provisions of section 232. Id.
at 1075, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 905. However, that evidence does not prove the existence of mental illness
or a causal connection between mental illness and harm to the child.
64. As the California Supreme Court has stated, "The chief value of an expert's testimony
in this field, as in all other fields, rests upon the material from which his opinion is fashioned and
the reasoning by which he progresses from his material to his conclusion." People v. Samuel, 29 Cal.
3d 489, 496-98, 629 P.2d 485, 488, 174 Cal. Rptr. 684, 687 (1981), quoting People v. Bassett, 69
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of the facts, a danger arises from the possibility that the mother
might have a violent drinking episode. However, no evidence
exists, at least from the court's discussion, that any drinking
episodes occurred in the past and, if they did, whether any harm
resulted to the children.
The court leaps from a diagnosis of alcoholism to the
conclusion that the child is in danger, and allows the psychiatric
experts to do the same, accepting unsupported conclusions without
questioning them. The first expert, Dr. Liu, stated that the mother
was "not capable of parenting her children" but did not state why,
other than speculating on the possibility of undefined drinking
episodes.' The second expert made the same conclusion, again
offering no examples of how the mother had posed a danger to her
children in the past or might do so in the future.'
Causation, that is, going beyond the demonstration of mental
disability to show that the mental disability renders the parent or
parents unable to adequately care for and control the child, appears
to be either ignored, delegated to the expert witness, or assumed
from the diagnosis. This last possibility is the most disturbing. As
the Carmaleta court understood, many parents with some mental
health diagnosis are nevertheless able to adequately care for and
control their children. 7 The new reading of the amended statute
incorporates an evidentiary presumption that anyone with a mental
health diagnosis is unable to parent.
In addition to a finding of mental disability, section 232(a)(6)
requires a finding that the mental disability "renders the parent or
parents unable to adequately care for and control the child." The
word "renders" implies that a causal connection is required
between the showing of mental disability and the showing of
Cal. 2d 122, 141,443 P.2d 777,70 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1968) and Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608,
617 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (emphasis in original). The supreme court has also stated that "psychiatric
evaluation is not absolute but only relatively illuminating." Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d
159, 174, 410 P.2d 838, 848, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 312 (1966).
65. Christina A., 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1081, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
66. Id.
67. In re Carmaleta B., 21 Cal. 3d 482, 492, 579 P.2d 514, 520, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623, 629
(1978).
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inadequate care and control.68 The mental disability must be the
cause of the inability to care for and control.
Some courts, perhaps subject to the myth of the violent mental
patient," dispense with the element of causation or assume that
all mental disorders cause an inability to parent.70 However, the
case law interpreting section 232(a)(6) contemplates not just any
mental health diagnosis but one with serious, demonstrated
ramifications for the care and control of the children.7 The
amendment to section 232 should not affect the validity of this case
law, which interprets the element of causation still present in the
amended statute.
For example, in In re Mark K, 72 the parent had been found
not guilty by reason of insanity of robbery and committed to
Atascadero State Hospital for seven years." From a locked
psychiatric unit, adequate care and control of children was not
possible and the causal connection was thus easily established. In
In re Amie M., the mother had been on conservatorship and
hospitalized periodically for seven years.74 The Amie M. court
stated:
68. "To render" is defined as -to cause to be or to become." THE RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1214 (1967).
69. National Institute of Mental Health, THE 14 WORST MYTHS ABOUT RECOVERED MENTAL
PATIENTS (1985) 11 ("Most people who have been mentally ill never went *berserk' in the first
place. Mental patients are more likely to be depressed and withdrawn than wild and aggressive.").
The media perpetuates the image: in one study of mental patients portrayed as characters in prime-
time television dramas, 73 percent went on to commit a serious act of violence before the hour was
over. By contrast, only three percent of those persons identified as mentally ill in the real world
commit serious acts of violence. P. Fink, SnTIMA: THE Isst]E THE PROGRESS, AND THE RESPONSE,
address to Changing Attitudes Towards Mental Illness: Prospects for Progress, symposium presented
by Northern California Psychiatric Association and California Alliance for the Mentally IH, February
28, 1989, San Francisco, California.
70. See, e.g., Christina A., 213 Cal. App. 3d 1073, 1081, 261 Cal. Rptr. 903, 908 (1989).
71. See infra note 116, discussing such diagnoses based on the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual ofthe American Psychiatric Association (DSM-IIR) as caffeine addiction and "oppositional
disorder" in adolescents.
72. 159 Cal. App. 3d 94,205 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1984). Note that the amended subdivision (a)(6)
was enacted in 1983. 1983 Cal. Stat. ch. 309, sec. 2, at 903.
73. In re Mark K., 159 Cal. App. 3d 94, 100, 205 Cal. Rptr. 393, 395 (1984).
74. 180 Cal. App. 3d 668, 670, 225 Cal. Rptr. 645, 646 (1986).
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[S]he refused to acknowledge her pregnancy with Arnie,
attributing her expanding abdomen to overeating or bathing,
and apparently believed her abdomen contained a dog and
cat; she accused her sister and brother-in-law of being
ghosts;... she believed she had set fire to the world with
a cigarette; she thought sewer lines were connected to her
kitchen sink.'
The Amie court might have met the Carmaleta standard without the
need to carve out new law.
In In re David B.,76 the mother believed she was receiving
messages from extraterrestrial beings." The mother had been
hospitalized for psychiatric evaluation in two separate and recent
cases, one involving violence to neighbors, the other involving
failure to get treatment for the flu. 78 At the time of the hearing
she was on a conservatorship and hospitalized.79 When she was
removed from her home, two strangled cats were found in the
apartment.
80
Although it interpreted an earlier version of section 232 in
Carmaleta, the California Supreme Court aptly noted that mental
disability in the context of terminating parental rights should not be
too loosely defined because "family rights, both the parent's and
the child's rights, should not be vulnerable to a too easy finding of
mental illness. ' '8 1 The Fourth District Court of Appeals has
observed:
The common concern of section 232's provisions is parental
conduct falling short of the minimal level demanded by
society. The severity of the neglect or depravity required to
invoke the statute reflects the concern for the rights of the
75. Id. at 670-71, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 646.
76. 91 Cal. App. 3d 184, 154 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1979)
77. Id. at 189, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 189, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
81. In re Carmaleta B., Cal. 3d 482,491,579 P.2d 514,519,146 Cal. Rptr. 623, 628 (1978).
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parent, as well as the best interests of the child, and
recognizes the far-reaching implications of the "drastic
remedy" of involuntary severance of the child-parent
bond.
8 2
The original legislative intent of section 232(a)(6) was "to
cover a situation where the parent is not committed to a state
hospital, but is hospitalized under a Short-Doyle program or similar
operation. This would provide local machinery that presently exists
for the state hospital situation."8 3 In other words, section
232(a)(6) was intended to do no more than extend provisions then
applying only to state hospitals to local hospitals as well.
The right to parent is a right of constitutional proportions.8 4
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the parent-
child relationship is protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment." ' 5 Anything less than "demonstrable
extreme cases of neglect" as a ground for terminating parental
rights arguably would constitute an "arbitrary and capricious" state
act. 6 As one California appellate court stated:
[Interference with the fundamental liberty of a child to be
raised by his or her parents cannot constitutionally be
countenanced by a mere showing of neglect [not shown to
be extreme]. To permit intervention for mere neglect would
be to permit the state to interfere with impunity in the
affairs of any family. 7
82. Guardianship of Baby Boy M., 66 Cal. App. 3d 254,265, 135 Cal. Rptr. 866, 871 (1977).
83. In re R.S., 167 Cal. App. 3d 946, 956, 213 Cal. Rptr 690, 695 (1985) (quoting contents
of letter sent from Director of Mental Hygiene for State Health and Welfare Agency on legislative
intent of Civil Code section 232(a)(6)).
84. In re Raya, 255 Cal. App. 2d 260,265, 63 Cal. Rptr. 252, 255 (1967) (noting that -[a]
dominant parental right to custody of the child pervades our law").
85. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). Termination of parental custody invokes
basic due process rights. Guardianship of Baby Boy M., 66 Cal. App. 3d 254, 265 n.5, 135 Cal. Rptr.
866, 871 n.5 (citing In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 688 (1974)); In re J.T., 40 Cal. App. 3d 633, 639,
115 Cal. Rptr. 553, 556 (1974).
86. In re Christina P., 175 Cal. App. 3d 115, 132, 220 Cal. Rptr. 525, 534 (1985).
87. Id. at 133, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
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The parent's behavior must be so extreme that it is "incompatible
with parenthood." 8  The mere showing that the parent suffers
from "any mental disability" does not necessarily demonstrate
extreme neglect that is incompatible with parenthood, and
termination of parent rights on this basis alone would conflict with
constitutional requirements.
The new, extremely broad reading of subdivision (a)(6) will
sweep into termination of custody proceedings many, many parents
who have some symptoms of some mental disability but who do
not otherwise display "conduct falling short of the minimal level
demanded by society"--"[t]he common concern of section 232's
[other] provisions." 9
Given the complete absence of debate and any reference to the
Carmaleta case, no reason exists to think that the legislature, when
it amended section 232(a)(6), intended to sweep that broadly or to
redefine the minimal level of conduct that society demands of
parents. Nothing in the legislative history suggests that the
legislature meant to break with the scheme of the rest of section
232 and permit termination of parental rights for conduct less
drastic than abandonment, neglect, cruelty, or conviction of a
dangerous felony, the traditional measures of parental unfitness.
IlH. THE EFFECT OF CONFERRING BROAD DISCRETION ON
SOCIAL WORKERS
In California, a peace officer or county social worker can take
temporary custody of a child for delivery to the probation officer
if he or she believes that the child meets the legal criteria for
dependency' and, "in addition, that the minor has an immediate
88. In re Shannon C., 179 Cal. App. 3d 334, 344, 224 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521 (1986).
89. See Baby Boy M., 66 Cal. App. 3d at 265, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 871 (noting concern common
to provisions contained in section 232).
90. "'Dependency" is the initial phase of state involvement in parenting, in which the child
becomes a dependent of the court pursuant to the Welfare and Institutions Code, pending decisions
on placement, family reunification, and other dispositional questions. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
300, et seq. (West 1984 & Supp. 1990) Final termination of parental rights would be accomplished
via California Civil Code section 232.
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need for medical care, or ... is in immediate danger of physical
or sexual abuse, or the physical environment or the fact that the
child is left unattended poses an immediate threat to the child's
health or safety." 91 The probation officer can refuse to release the
child to the child's parents if the officer believes that the child
requires protection.92 With the approval of a court, 93 the child
can then be kept from the parent pending a further hearing on
whether the court has jurisdiction to make the child a dependent of
the court and, if so, what dispositional findings the court should
make.94 Under the typical family "reunification" plan, the child
is placed in temporary foster care while the parent is ordered to
undergo counseling, parenting classes, and supervised visits with
the child.95 The state may petition for permanent termination of
parental rights if it feels at the end of a twelve-month period that
the parent has failed the plan.96
Obviously, the social worker has a great deal of power during
the reunification period to decide whether the parent will ultimately
and permanently lose custody. The social worker is often the only
expert witness at the termination of rights hearing conducted
pursuant to section 232. The social worker's testimony that the
parent has not cooperated with the services offered, or has
cooperated but failed to overcome the initial problems for which
the social worker recommended court intervention, will often
suffice alone to support an order permanently terminating parental
91. CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE §§ 305, 306 (West Supp. 1990).
92. Id. § 309.
93. Id. § 315.
94. Id. § 360 et seq.
95. Id. § 361.5.
96. At the permanent termination of rights stage, governed by section 232 of the Civil Code,
the petitioner need no longer prove unfitness to parent but need only demonstrate that the parent
failed to complete the reunification plan. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(7) (West Supp. 1990). Thus, the
petitioner need not prove the mental disability again at the termination stage. The effect is to ratify
the finding of mental disability made at the initial dependency stage, which requires only a
preponderance of the evidence. CAL. WELl. & INST. CODE § 355 (West Supp. 1990). The termination
finding under section 232 must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. CAL- CIV. CODE §
232(c) (West Supp. 1990). Thus, the petitioner can use section 232(a)(7) as a bootstrap to achieve
permanent termination of parental rights while evading the need to prove mental disability by clear
and convincing evidence.
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rights. The threat of losing the child constitutes a potent tool that
the social worker may use to impose the social worker's opinions
on the parent.
Like jailhouse psychiatric examinations for purposes of
sentencing or insanity pleas, mental health evaluations of parents
for the purpose of family intervention must take into account one
basic element: the subject of the evaluation cannot place in the
evaluator the trust one often places in a therapist. Unlike private
therapists in a voluntary setting, therapists who evaluate parents in
child dependency proceedings are not pledged to keep the parent's
personal life confidential. On the contrary, everyone involved,
including a savvy parent, knows that whatever the client tells the
therapist will come out in court. Unlike a client in voluntary
therapy, the parent cannot rely on the therapist to act in the client's
expressed interests. The state mental health evaluator may become
the chief witness against the parent.
The validity of psychological evaluations that may form the
primary evidence against the parent seriously diminishes if the
subject does not freely participate in the process. One California
court has recognized that a lack of trust and confidence between
therapist and patient seriously hampers the therapist's ability to
make a diagnosis.' Without an accurate diagnosis, no substantial
evidence supports the judgment of the court. As the court stated,
"Psychoanalysis and psychotherapy are dependent upon the fullest
revelation of the most intimate and embarrassing details of the
patient's life . . . .Unless a patient ...is assured that such
information can and will be held in utmost confidence, he will be
reluctant to make the full disclosure upon which diagnosis and
treatment . . . depends." 98 Professional literature supports the
court's conclusion: "[Tihe amount of self disclosure that occurred
97. Scull v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 3d 784,789,254 Cal. Rptr. 24,26 (1988) (citing
Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1025,
1040-41 (1974)). "The accurate diagnosis and effective treatment in psychotherapy are greatly
dependent upon conditions of trust and confidentiality between patient and therapist." Id.
98. See id., (noting Sen. Judiciary Comm. comment to CAL. EVID. CODE, § 1014 (West
1966)).
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in a simulated psychiatric interview differed significantly according
to the indicated purpose of the interview.""
In addition, one professional study concludes that a patient who
is hostile to the examiner stands a greater chance of being
diagnosed with a serious mental disorder."0 Many therapists view
the lack of cooperation as evidence of mental illness."' However,
California law expressly holds that refusal of treatment for mental
illness is not in itself evidence of mental illness.1°2 If hostility to
the California mental health system were a symptom of mental
disability, many prominent legislators, mental health professionals,
and social critics would be candidates for loss of custody of their
children.103
In the context of terminating parental rights, social workers are
asked to do more than their professional training prepares them to
do. They are asked to make predictions of future behavior, in the
words of the statute, whether the parent is likely to remain mentally
disabled "in the foreseeable future" and whether the parent will,
now and in the future, be "unable to adequately care for and
control the child.'0 4
Numerous studies show that mental health professionals lack
both the training and qualifications to make predictions about
future behavior with any certainty. In fact, the California Supreme
Court has stated that, "psychiatrists themselves would be the first
to admit that however desirable an infallible crystal ball might be,
99. EDumAN & SNEAD, Self-Disclosure in a Simulated Psychiatric Interview, 38 J. OF
CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 354-58 (1972), quoted in J. ZISKiN, COPjNG WITH
PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 167 (3d ed. 1981).
100. ZISKiN, supra note 99, at 185, citing Braginsky & Braginsly, Psychologists: High Priests
of the Middle Class, 5 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 138 (1973). "When a patient expressed negative.
attitudes toward the psychiatrist or psychologist, he was diagnosed as being more severely
disturbed." Id.
101. D. STANNARD-FRIEL, HARASSMENT THERAPY: A CASE STUDY OF PSYCHIATRIC VIOLENCE
64 (1981). "'When patients did not improve, it demonstrated the patients' 'lack of responsibility,'
their 'sickness,' and their need for more treatment, more confrontation, more harassment therapy. This
is a common rationalization in psychiatry.- Id. (citing J.L. SIMMONS, DEVIANTS 113 (1969)).
102. In re Conservatorship of Walker, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1082, 1110,242 Cal. Rptr. 289,299
(1987).
103. See supra note 5 (noting some critics of mental health system in California).
104. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(6) (West Supp. 1990).
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it is not among the tools of their profession." 10 5 The United
States Supreme Court has expressed doubt about the ability of
psychiatrists to predict future behavior.1 6  An influential
article1" by Ennis and Litwack states,
Unfortunately, judges and legislators are not aware of the
enormous and relatively consistent body of professional
literature questioning the reliability and validity of psychiatric
evaluations and predictions .... Based upon our reading of the
professional literature, we have concluded that.., there is little
or no evidence that psychiatrists are more "expert" in making
the predictions relevant to civil commitment than laymen...
I108
The psychiatric profession does not possess the necessary tools
for the specific task of predicting future behavior with certainty. As
one article stated, "The studies... indicate that psychiatrists often
disagree in their judgments and that even where they do agree
those judgments -- especially predictive judgments -- are often
105. People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 325-26, 535 P.2d 352, 365, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 501
(1975).
106. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,584 (1975) (Burger, CJ., concurring). "There can
be little responsible debate concerning 'the uncertainty of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness
of professional judgment."' Id. (quoting Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366,375 (1956) and
citing also Ennis & Litwack, Psychiany and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CALiF. L. REv. 693 (1974)).
107. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 584 (Burger, CJ., concurring);
Conservatorship of Roulet, 23 Cal. 3d 219, 230 n.8, 590 P.2d 1, 7 n.8, 152 Cal. Rptr. 425, 431 n.8
(1979) (citing with approval).
108. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 106, at 695. See also Morris, Conservatorship for the
Gravely Disabled: California 's Nondeclaration ofNonindependence, 15 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 201,206
n.27 (1978) ("The reliability and validity of psychiatric evaluations and predictions has been
questioned throughout the medical and psychiatric literature"); People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306,
323-24,535 P.2d 352,363, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488,499 (1975) (quoting In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 665,
666 (D.C. Cir. 1973)) (noting "the fact that psychiatric testimony either diagnosing mental disorder
or predicting future dangerousness is 'far from satisfactory' and has 'never been characterized by a
high degree of accuracy"); Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076, 1086 (Ist Cir. 1983) (noting "the
inherently speculative nature of psychiatric predictions"); Note, Developments in the Law-Civil
Commitment of the Mentally 11187 HARV. L Rnv. 1190, 1300 (1974) (noting "the poor predictive
capacities of psychiatrists").
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wrong."' 10 9 In one study of thirty-eight patients who escaped or
were released from a psychiatric hospital without the approval of
their psychiatrists, almost half "made a satisfactory adjustment to
the community (they had not been in serious trouble with the law,
had not been rehospitalized, and were caring for themselves). ' ' . °
In that study, the psychiatrists' predictions of future behavior
proved false in almost half of the cases."'
In a report of the American Psychiatric Association Task Force,
the psychiatric profession concurs: no one has the ability to predict
future behavior and, furthermore, predictions err on the side of
predicting future violent behavior "thus branding as 'dangerous'
many persons who are in reality totally harmless."' Reliance on
these evaluations as a basis for terminating parental rights
introduces an unacceptable element of chance. The severe intrusion
on the rights of the parent is not outweighed by a compelling state
interest if the state action will be wrong as often as it is right. By
delegating to social workers the effective power to remove children
from their parents, the state has given excessive deference to a
sometimes arbitrary, sometimes unpredictable, and often
unreviewed and unchallenged profession.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS ON THE BASIS OF MENTAL DISABILITY
In 1962, a group of psychologists surveyed a major
metropolitan area and reported that 81.5 percent of the population
suffered from psychiatric disorder and displayed significant
109. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 109, at 719 (emphasis added). See also Goleman,
Psychologists' Expert Testimony Called Unscientific, New York Times, October 11, 1988 at B7, col.
1.
110. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 106, at 717 citing Rappeport, Lassen & Gruenwald,
Evaluations and Follow-up of State Hospital Patients Who Had Sanity Hearings, 118 AM. J.
PSYCHiAT. 1079 (1962).
111. Id.
112. People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 327, 535 P.2d 352, 366, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 502
(1975) (quoting American Psychiatric Assn. Task Force Report, Clinical Aspects of the Violent
Individual 28 (1974)).
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symptoms of mental pathology.113 Twenty-five per cent of the
population was impaired and exhibited "mental morbidity," with
symptoms so serious as to have halting, laming, or crippling effects
on the performance of daily life." 4 Only 18.5 percent of the
population could be considered free of significant symptoms of
mental pathology. 5 A broad interpretation of section 232(a)(6)
could potentially subject as many as 81.5 percent of all parents to
termination of custody of their children.116
For this reason, it is important to focus on and give meaning to
the language that clearly and unambiguously limits what kind of
mental disability may serve as a criterion for loss of parental rights.
The clear language of the statute provides this limit: Only those
parents whose mental disability renders them unable to care for and
control their children may lose parental rights.
To "care for and control" has been defined for purposes of
dependency proceedings in terms of the parental duties "to furnish
necessary clothing, food, shelter, or medical attention or other
remedial care for his child. 1 1 7 Section 300(a) of the California
Welfare and Institutions Code, governing dependency, has been
upheld against a constitutional challenge for vagueness only
through narrow construction of its language." 8 Interpretation of




116. In addition, diagnoses based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American
Psychiatric Association (DSM-IIR) are notoriously subjective. The DSM, which provides a
sanctioned list of mental disabilities (see, e.g. former title 9 California Code of Regulations § 813,
designating DSM-IIR diagnoses as "mental disorders" for purposes of civil commitment pursuant
to section 5150 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code) includes as mental disabilities the
following: "caffeine intoxication," "tobacco withdrawal," too much anxiety ("overanxious
disorder"), not enough anxiety ("avoidant disorder"), stuttering, and resistance of adolescents to
authority ("oppositional disorder"). DSM-IIIR at 15-19. As Dr. Ziskin notes, "'there is virtually no
one who cannot be found by psychiatrists to be suffering from some psychiatric disorder." ZIsKiN,
supra note 99, at p. 47. The California Supreme Court has noted that the DSM "only serves to
highlight the lack of standards and potential for confusion, as the American Psychiatric Association
frequently alters its definitions of what constitutes a mental disorder." Conservatorship of Roulet,
23 Cal. 3d 219, 234 n.14, 590 P.2d 1, 10 n.14, 152 Cal. Rptr. 425, 434 n.14 (1979).
117. In re J.T., 40 Cal. App. 3d 633, 638, 115 Cal. Rptr. 553,556 (1974) (quoting CAL. PEN.
CODE § 270 and interpreting CAL. WELFt. & INST. CODE § 300(a)).
118. Id.
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section 232 by recourse to the same language in section 300 could
remedy a great deal of mischief, particularly in cases where no
evidence exists other than the questionable inference to be drawn
from the psychiatric diagnosis that the parent cannot furnish
necessary clothing, food, shelter, medical attention, or other
remedial care for his or her children.
Although it might be argued that pre-Amie cases have been
superseded, several of those cases raise constitutional and policy
concerns that survive the amendment. The Amie court saw the
amendment as effecting a significant shift in focus, "from the
parent's mental illness [and parental rights] to the needs of the
child, where it assertedly belongs.""" Concern for the best
interests of the child is not a new idea. Decisions preceding Arnie
took this concern into consideration when balancing the interests
of the child against the rights of the parents. As one court stated:
The severity of the neglect or depravity required to invoke the
statute reflects the concern for the rights of the parent, as well
as the best interests of the child, and recognizes the
far-reaching implications of the "drastic remedy" of
involuntary severance of the child-parent bond. Due process
and basic fairness may well require the judgment to be
supported by articulated reasons before a parent is made to
suffer the ultimate penalty of losing a child because of alleged
neglect, cruelty, depravity or physical abuse of the minor.
120
No one questions the importance of serving the child's
best interests. However, the state may sever the parent-child bond
only when the parent's conduct falls short of the minimal level
demanded by society and when this proposition has been proved in
conformity with due process.
Even without a provision for termination of parental rights on
the basis of mental disability, the present scheme in California has
119. In re Arnie M., 180 Cal. App. 3d 668, 673, 225 Cal. Rptr. 645, 648 (1989).
120. Guardianship of Baby Boy M., 66 Cal. App. 3d 254,265, 135 Cal. Rptr. 866, 872 (1977)
(citations omitted).
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been criticized for breaking up too many families. A recent report
of the County Welfare Directors Association of California
concluded:
Too much money is being wasted on a burgeoning network
of foster homes for children who are too young and
emotionally unfit for out-of-home care, but not enough
money is available to help families stay together.... T]he
lack of money for preventing new foster care cases "is a
form of neglect our children and families cannot afford..
. The state is inflicting added stress on its most vulnerable
children because of laws and policies that are skewed in
favor of breaking up families .... 121
Although the California Supreme Court decided the Carmaleta
case before the amendment to Civil Code section (a)(6), nothing in
the present wording of the subdivision or in the legislative history
indicates any abandonment of the concern that parental rights
would be trampled by a "too easy finding of mental illness."1
22
Nothing indicates that the amendment to section 232(a)(6) does
away with the long-standing requirement of serious, demonstrable
lack of ability to care for and control the child falling below the
minimal level demanded by society.
Inability to care for and control the child is a theme that runs
through the other subdivisions of section 232, as well as through
the Welfare and Institutions Code provisions governing dependency
proceedings. 123 As noted earlier in this Article, the care-and-
control language reflects the common concern for "parental
conduct falling short of the minimal level demanded by
society." 24 As one court noted, "[T]he statutory criterion of
121. DelVecchio, "State Fails Foster Kids, Group Says," San Francisco Chronicle, April 27,
1990, § I, at 4, col. 1, (quoting County Welfare Directors Association of California, Ten Reasons to
Invest in the Families of California (1990)).
122. In re Carinaleta B., 21 Cal. 3d 482, 491, 579 P.2d 514, 519, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623, 628
(1978).
123. CAL. WELF. & IN sT. CODE § 300(a) (West Supp. 1990). See supra note 90 (discussing
section 300).
124. Baby Boy M., 66 Cal. App. 3d at 265, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
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Even under the current wording of the statute, these
considerations should limit its application to cases of severe mental
disability with demonstrable causal inability to care for and control
the child. For example, in In re Micah S., both parents had long
histories of psychiatric hospitalization continuing to the time of
hearing.1 26 The mother had been hospitalized over twenty times,
including one involuntary commitment during the six-month review
period, and stood an eighty-to-ninety percent chance of future
hospitalizations according to one of the psychiatrists.127 The
father had a history of drug and alcohol abuse problems and six
arrests. The mother had such severe problems managing her budget
that she had been placed on a representative payee program;
nevertheless, she frequently ran out of money mid-month and failed
to pay bills. 2 Section 232 could more legitimately limit itself to
parenting that rises to this level of severity.129
Use of the mental disability criterion to terminate parental
rights requires extreme sensitivity. Many persons function with a
diagnosis of mental disability and make good parents. Society
encourages these persons to seek help. Many of them may not do
so if a psychiatric diagnosis would expose them to possible
termination of parental rights.
To protect the constitutional right to raise one's children as one
sees fit without state interference, any definition of mental disorder,
mental disability, or mental illness, similar terms for which the
courts have not given distinct meaning, must be narrowly
interpreted. As the Carmaleta court stated, "[F]amily rights, both
the parent's and the child's rights, should not be vulnerable to a too
easy finding of mental illness. Indeed, the strictness of this
125. In re Raya, 255 Cal. App. 2d 260, 265, 63 Cal. Rptr. 252, 255 (1967).
126. In re Micah S., 198 Cal. App. 3d 557, 561, 243 Cal. Rptr. 756, 758 (1988).
127. Id. at 562, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 759.
128. Id. at 562, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 758-59.
129. Whether the state should be involved at all in judging who is a fit parent is beyond the
scope of this Article, as is the question of whether "mental illness," the very existence of which has
been repeatedly questioned, should provide any basis for state action.
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definition of mental illness has acted as a safeguard to protect the
primacy of the family."13 Although Civil Code section 232 now
reads differently, the basic concern that the statute address only
parental conduct falling short of the minimal level demanded by
society, conduct demonstrating a severity of neglect or depravity,
has not changed. To that extent, the constitutional and policy
concerns raised by the Carmaleta court survive the amendment to
section 232.
CONCLUSION
Despite the trappings of computerized test scoring and scientific
jargon, the diagnosis of mental health is an art. As one court stated,
"[P]sychiatry is at best an inexact science if, indeed, it is a science.
S. I.->, Used in a voluntary context, many persons find mental
health treatment of benefit. Used to invoke the power of the state
and revoke constitutional rights, determinations based on mental
health must be scrutinized with the greatest of care.
Every day, children are burned by sun or hot water, or slip in
the tub. Parents are late to pick them up, miss busses, or let the
press of business or other activities prevent them from spending as
much time as they would like with their children. These parents do
not lose their children because the danger does not rise to a level
the legislature has identified as requiring state intervention. Why
should the result be different because the parent has a history of
seeking mental health treatment?
Under the microscope of the mental disability evaluation
process, unnoteworthy behavior that many parents display becomes
clinically significant. To understand the truth of this proposition,
one need only consider whether a parent would qualify to lose his
or her child under any of the other subdivisions of section 232,
when the only evidence against that parent is a history of mental
130. In re Carmaleta B., 21 Cal. 3d 482, 491, 579 P.2d 514, 519, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623, 628
(1978).
131. Suggs v. La Vallee, 570 F.2d 1092, 1119 (2d Cir. 1982) (Kaufman, CJ., concurring).
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health treatment. In too many cases, the parent's mental disability
and its threat to the children's safety does not rise to that level. The
state now has the power to petition for termination on the sole
grounds of mental disability, when the state could not prove a case
by any other method. The legislature has already recognized that
not all persons identified as mentally ill are dangerous or unfit to
parent. It is time for the courts to do the same.
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